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ARTICLE
EXCLUDING TESTIMONY OF FINANCIAL
EXPERTS IN FEDERAL LITIGATION: HOW
FAR DO THE DAUBERT STANDARDS
EXTEND?
CECIL C. KUHNE, III*
INTRODUCTION
In the 1993 landmark decision of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1 the United States Supreme Court
held that the brief provisions of Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence impose upon a trial court certain
stringent, enumerated obligations in order to assure that
expert testimony presented to a jury is both reliable and
* Mr. Kuhne is counsel in the Dallas office of Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P.
1 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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relevant.2 While Rule 702 refers broadly to "scientific,
technical or other specialized knowledge,"3 the Daubert
decision dealt more narrowly with the admissibility of
scientific evidence.4 The unsettled question of whether the
exacting standards for the admissibility of expert scientific
testimony established in Daubert applied equally to expert
testimony based on technical or other specialized knowledge
was finally resolved, after much disparity among the circuit
courts of appeal, in 1999 by Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v.
Carmichael,5 which held that the basic gatekeeping
function for trial judges mandated by Rule 702 applies to
all expert testimony, not just scientific testimony.6
Daubert maintains that Federal Rule of Evidence 702
imposes a special obligation on a trial judge to act as a
gatekeeper to ensure that "any and all scientific testimony
or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."7
The decision discussed four factors - testing, peer review,
error rates, and acceptability by the scientific community -
that a court should examine in determining the reliability
of a particular scientific theory or technique.8 In extending
the Daubert factors to nonscientific testimony, the Supreme
Court in Kumho Tire pointed out the seemingly obvious fact
2 Id. at 593-94 (dealing with expert testimony on the issue of whether the drug
Bendectin causes birth defects). Federal Rule of Evidence 702 at the time of the decision
provided: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, expertise, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise." Fed. R. Evid. 702.
3 FED.R.EVID. 702. Daubert made clear that Rule 702 displaced the "general
acceptance" test enunciated in Fry v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923) (holding that expert
opinion based on a scientific technique is inadmissible unless the technique is "generally
accepted" and reliable in the relevant scientific community). See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 586-
89.
4 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
5 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
6 See id. at 147 ('The initial question before us is whether this basic gatekeeping
obligation applies only to 'scientific' testimony or to all expert testimony. We, like the
parties, believe that it applies to all expert testimony.").
7 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
8 Id. at 593-94.
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that Rule 702 does not distinguish between "scientific
knowledge" and "technical or other specialized" knowledge.9
The Court in Kumho Tire reasoned that Daubert referred
only to scientific knowledge because that was the nature of
the expertise at issue, not because of an intent to
distinguish between scientific and other types of knowledge
which may form the basis of expert testimony. 10 Noting that
there is no clear line dividing the various types of
knowledge, the Court saw no need to distinguish between
them."1
Kumho Tire concluded that regardless of the type of
knowledge under consideration, Rule 702 requires a judicial
inquiry as a precondition to admissibility, and that when
the testimony's factual basis, data, principles, methods, or
application is called into question, the trial judge must
determine whether the testimony has a reliable basis in the
knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline.12 The
Supreme Court summed up its conclusions thus:
We conclude that Daubert's general holding -
setting forth the trial judge's general "gatekeeping"
obligation - applies not only to testimony based on
"scientific" knowledge, but also to testimony based
on "technical" and "other specialized" knowledge.
See Fed. R. Evid. 702. We also conclude that a trial
court may consider one or more specific factors that
Daubert mentioned when doing so will help
determine that testimony's reliability. But, as the
Court stated in Daubert, the test of reliability is
9 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147.
10 Id. at 147-48 (pointing out that the Daubert decision, based on Federal Rules 702
and 703, allowed for considerable latitude with respect to expert testimony without regard
to its classification as "scientific" or otherwise).
11 Id. at 151 ("We do not believe that Rule 702 creates a schematism that segregates
expertise by type while mapping certain types of questions to certain kinds of experts.
Life and the legal cases that it generates are too complex to warrant so definitive a
match.").
12 Id. at 149 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592).
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"flexible," and Daubert's list of specific factors
neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all
experts in every case. Rather, the law grants a
district court the same broad latitude when it
decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in
respect to its ultimate reliability determination. 13
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 has subsequently been
amended to incorporate the holdings of Daubert and Kumho
Tire,14 though the holdings of those decisions as they relate
to the admissibility of expert testimony have not been
altered as a result.15
I. THE BROADER MANDATE OF KUMHO TIRE
Kumho Tire confirmed that Daubert's general standard of
evidentiary reliability applies to all expert opinions
governed by Rule 702,16 and that Rule 702 requires as a
prerequisite to admissibility a "valid connection to the
pertinent inquiry."17 While the Kuhmo Tire decision
establishes that the factors suggested in Daubert "may"
control a reliability determination in a particular case, the
13 Id. at 141-42.
14 See FED. R. EVID. 702. The amended rule, incorporating the Daubert and Kumho
Tire holdings, now provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts
or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3)
the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
Id.
15 See Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 199 n.1 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting
that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 "was amended to reflect the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Daubert and Kumho Tire... [The amendment does not alter the standard for
evaluating the admissibility of experts' opinions as articulated in those cases.")
16 See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147 (specifying that the rule does not distinguish
between "scientific" knowledge and "technical" or "other specialized" knowledge).
17 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92; see also David L. Faigman et al., How Good Is
Good Enough? Expert Evidence Under Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645,
650 (2000) (reiterating Daubert's contention that admissibility requires a "valid scientific
connection" to the inquiry).
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general "reliability" and "fit" of the expert testimony must
be supported by evidence in the record.18 Therefore,
although the standards for determining the fact of
reliability may have been broadened, the requirement
remains that parties offering expert opinion testimony bear
the burden of proving the fact of reliability by a
preponderance of evidence.19
The Court in Kumho Tire reiterated that a trial judge
must be given considerable discretion in determining
whether particular expert testimony is reliable.20 When the
specific factors identified in Daubert are reasonable
measures of reliability, they should be considered,
including: (1) whether a theory or technique can be (and has
been) tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer
review and publication; (3) whether there is a high known
or potential rate of error with respect to a particular
technique, and whether there are standards controlling the
technique's operation; and (4) whether the theory or
technique enjoys general acceptance within a relevant
scientific community.21 However, the Court emphasized
that this list of factors is not exhaustive or definitive, and
the factors to be considered in any particular case depend
upon the specific facts at issue.22
18 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141-42 (recognizing that Daubert's "list of specific factors
neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case").
19 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (acknowledging that relevance of evidence must be
established by preponderance of proof).
20 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152-53 ("[W]hether Daubert's specific factors are, or are
not, reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case is a matter that the law grants
the trial judge broad latitude to determine.").
21 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95 for further explanation of the factors, and Kumho
Tire, 526 U.S. at 152, which acknowledges that the Daubert factors are "reasonable
measures of the reliability of expert testimony." On remand, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Daubert v. Merell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., (Daubert
I) 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995), added a fifth factor, suggesting that the court
additionally inquire whether the expert's testimony relates to "matters growing naturally
and directly out of research they conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they
have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying."
22 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (indicating that a specific "checklist or test" was not
wise given the many factors that can affect an inquiry); see also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at
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The Supreme Court also specified that an appellate court
is to apply an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing
a trial court's decision on reliability of expert testimony.23
The Court reasoned that a "trial court must have the same
latitude in deciding how to test an expert's reliability as it
enjoys when deciding whether that expert's relevant
testimony is reliable."24 Otherwise, the judge would lack the
discretionary authority needed both to avoid unnecessary
proceedings where the reliability of an expert's methods is
properly taken for granted and to require appropriate
proceedings where the expert's reliability is legitimately
questioned.25
The facts underlying Kumho Tire were straightforward.
The tire of a minivan blew out, causing an accident in
which one passenger died and several others were severely
injured. The plaintiff sued the tire manufacturer and its
distributor, claiming the tire was defective. The plaintiffs
relied in large part on deposition testimony of an expert in
tire failure analysis.26 The district court excluded the
expert's testimony on the grounds that it was not reliable
under the Daubert standards and granted summary
judgment for the defendants.27 The Eleventh Circuit
reversed and remanded the case for further consideration,
holding that Daubert applies only to expert testimony based
141 (noting that the factors laid out in Daubert are not comprehensive).
23 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152-53; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139
(1977) (explaining that Daubert did not change the evidentiary ruling standard of review).
24 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152.
25 See id.; see also Gen. Elec., 522 U.S. at 142 (emphasizing that appellate courts must
apply abuse of discretion review to evidentiary rulings, whether such rulings involve
expert testimony or not).
26 See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 142.
27 Id. at 145-46. On first impression, the trial court found that the expert's
methodology was unacceptable after failing a number of the Daubert factors, namely, peer
review, known potential rate of error, and degree of acceptance within the relevant
scientific community. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration on
the issue, agreeing that its own application of the Daubert factors was too "inflexible."
However, despite a more flexible review and acknowledgement that the factors are
"simply illustrative," the court affirmed its earlier decision and excluded the testimony.
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on application of scientific principles, not to testimony
based on skill or experience.28 The Supreme Court,
reversing the appellate court's judgment, applied the
Daubert factors to the case at hand, concluding that the
doubts which triggered the district court's initial inquiry
into the reliability of the expert's testimony were
reasonable.29
The question before the Court was not the reliability of
the expert's methodology in general, but whether the expert
could reliably determine the cause of failure of the
particular tire under consideration.30 The expert concluded
that the tire had traveled far enough that some of the tread
had been worn bald, that it should have been taken out of
service, that it had been inadequately repaired for
punctures, and that it bore marks which would indicate
abuse, not a defect.31 Moreover, the expert's own testimony
cast considerable doubt on the reliability of his theory about
the need for at least two signs of abuse.32 Furthermore,
there was no indication that other experts in the industry
used this particular approach, nor were there references to
28 Id. at 146 (the Eleventh Circuit holding that the Daubert Court "explicitly limited
its holding" to the application of specific scientific principles, therefore rendering it
inapplicable where experts' methodology relies only on the expert's skills).
29 Id. at 158. The Court acknowledged the trial court's more flexible reconsideration
of defendant's motion to exclude the expert testimony, noting that the court ultimately
excluded the testimony based on its failure to meet Daubert or "any other set of
reasonable reliability criteria." Id. As such, the trial court's determination was reasonable
and within their "lawful discretion."
30 Id. at 153-54. The Court stated:
For one thing, and contrary to respondents' suggestion, the specific issue before the court
was not the reasonableness in general of a tire expert's use of a visual and tactile
inspection to determine whether over-deflection had caused the tire's tread to separate
from its steel-belted carcass. Rather, it was the reasonableness of using such an approach,
along with Carlson's particular method analyzing the data thereby obtained, to draw a
conclusion regarding the particular matter to which the expert testimony was directly
relevant.
Id.
31 Id. at 154 ("[The relevant issue was whether the expert could reliably determine
the cause of this tire's separation.").
32 Id. at 154-55.
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articles or papers which validated the approach.33
The Supreme Court noted that deposition transcripts and
an earlier report prepared by the expert cast considerable
doubt on the reliability of the expert's theory and
methodology.34 The district court had found that none of the
Daubert factors indicated that the expert's testimony was
reliable and that there were no countervailing factors
operating in favor of admissibility.35 For these reasons, the
Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that the expert testimony was
unreliable.36
II. DAUBER S APPLICATION TO FINANCIAL EXPERTS
In dealing with the admissibility of testimony by financial
experts - particularly economists and accountants - the
courts have emphasized that after the initial determination
that an expert is a qualified practitioner,37 the testimony
offered by the expert must be deemed helpful to the jury,38
as determined by the reliability of the methodology
33 Id. at 157.
34 Id. at 154.
35 Id. at 156 (observing that the trial court, upon rehearing, not only applied Daubert
but also looked to the expert's testimony itself for factors which would bolster the
reliability of his methodology as applied to the tire in question).
36 Id. at 158. The concurring opinion in Kumho Tire makes clear, however, that a trial
court is still capable of abusing its discretion in such matters. Justice Scalia wrote:
I join in the opinion of the Court, which makes clear that the discretion it endorses - trial-
court discretion in choosing the manner of testing expert reliability - is not discretion to
abandon the gatekeeping function. I think it worth adding that this is not discretion to
perform the function inadequately. Rather, it is discretion to choose among reasonable
means of excluding expertise that is fausse and science that is junky. Though, as the
Court makes clear today, the Daubert factors are not wholly writ, in a particular case the
failure to apply one or another of them may be unreasonable, and hence an abuse of
discretion.
526 U.S. at 158-59.
37 This article will not attempt to cover those judicial issues related to the initial
issue of an expert's qualifications; for such a discussion, see Sofia Androgue & Alan
Ratliff, Kicking the Tires after Kumho: The Bottom Line on Admitting Financial Expert
Testimony, 37 Hous. L. REV. 431, 454-64 (2000).
38 See FED.R.EVID. 702 ("If [the knowledge at issue] will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. . .").
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employed and by the relevance of the opinion to the facts at
issue.39 The courts in these financial cases often refer
specifically to the Daubert "scientific" factors - testing, peer
review, error rates, and acceptability by the relevant
scientific community40 - but it should be emphasized that
Daubert noted that the factors to be applied in assessing
the expert testimony are flexible and not exhaustive41 and
that it is axiomatic that in many instances of evaluating
financial data these so-called scientific factors may not be
the most appropriate.42
39 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591-93 (1993).
40 See, i.e., United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant, Inc., 173 F.R.D. 675 (D.
Kan. 1997), in which the district court excluded an economist's testimony as to the value
of plaintiffs trade name for lack of the expert's qualifications, lack of peer review and
publication of the methodology used, and lack of acceptance by the scientific community.
The court implied that the expert was a hired gun whose testimony was suspect, noting
that he was president and shareholder of an economics and statistical consulting firm
which provided 90% of its services to the legal profession. Id. at 679. The court also stated
that if expert testimony is not based on independent research, there must be other
evidence that the testimony is based upon scientifically valid principles evidenced by peer
review and publication. The court found that the expert violated a fundamental principle
of economics in his value estimates and there was no objective, verifiable evidence from
which it could conclude that the expert's methodology was accepted by others in the field.
Id. at 686.
41 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95 (emphasizing that the inquiry envisioned is
flexible); see also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141 (clarifying that the Court in Daubert stated
the test of reliability is "flexible" and the list of specific factors neither necessarily nor
exclusively applies to all experts or in every case).
42 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Daubert 11), 43 F.3d 1311, 1318
(9th Cir. 1995), which suggests that a proponent of scientific testimony show that: (1) the
testimony grows out of pre-litigation research, or (2) the research has been subjected to
peer review. Where such evidence is unavailable, Daubert II instructs that the proponent
may satisfy its burden through the testimony of its own experts, but that for such a
showing to be sufficient:
[The experts] must explain precisely how they went about researching their
conclusions and point to some objective source - a learned treatise, the policy
statement of a professional association, a published article in a reputable scientific
journal or the like - to show that they have followed the scientific method, as it is
practiced by (at least) a recognized minority of scientists in their field.
Id. at 1319. Not all of the factors are equally applicable in a given case, and it often makes
little sense to ask whether the technique employed "can be (and has been) tested" or what
the "known or potential rate of error might be." Id. at 1317 n.4 (quoting Daubert); see also
Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1996), which states
that "testing" and "rate of errors" factors are not applicable when the expert has not done
the original research but has drawn different conclusions from the scientists who
performed the original work.
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Recognizing the easily manipulable and potentially
misleading use of financial testimony,43 the federal courts
have in a number of instances concluded that the
methodology used by the expert was inappropriate,44 and
the expert testimony in several of those cases have
appeared particularly egregious to the courts, with the
evidence being rejected on almost every conceivable
ground.45 The exclusion of the testimony is of course
generally within the trial court's discretion, even if the
methodology used by the expert is universally accepted
within the relevant field.46 It is often not the general
acceptance of the methodology within the discipline that is
crucial, but rather the reasonableness of using the
approach, along with the expert's particular method of
analyzing the data obtained, "to draw a conclusion
regarding the particular matter to which the expert
testimony was directly relevant. "47
In financial cases, a district court must therefore
determine whether the expert's underlying reasoning or
methodology is scientifically valid and whether that
reasoning or methodology can be properly applied to the
43 See Adams v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., Inc., 2 F. Supp.2d 1077, 1094 (S.D. Ind. 1998)
(explaining that verification of statistical evidence involves determining if the
measurement process was reliable, valid, and accurate).
44 See Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v. American Simmental Ass'n., 178 F.3d 1035,
1041 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting "no evidence in the record that other economists use before-
and-after modeling to support conclusions of causes of market fluctuation"); see also Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (finding that scientific validity of a
methodology is the key to admissibility, and that a court may find too great a disparity
between the data and the opinion offered).
45 See McGuire v. City of Santa Fe, 954 F. Supp. 230, 232-33 (D.N.M. 1996)
(excluding economist's testimony on hedonic damages because methodology and theory:
(1) was not easily tested; (2) lacked any widely accepted standards for uniformly
measuring the value of the pleasure of life; (3) was found by peers to be lacking any
verifiable basis; (4) lacked proof of any known error rate for calculations; (5) had been
generally rejected by courts; and (6) was an inappropriate measure of damages in a
wrongful termination and job discrimination action).
46 See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 158 ("In sum, Rule 702 grants the district judge the
discretionary authority, reviewable for its abuse, to determine reliability in light of the
particular facts and circumstances of the particular case.").
47 Id. at 154.
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facts at hand.48 Among the matters to be considered is
whether the testimony is "sufficiently tied to the facts of the
case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual
dispute."49 This relationship is commonly referred to as
"fit," meaning that the expert testimony must not only be
based on reliable science but must also suit the particular
situation before the court:
[C]onclusion and methodology are not entirely
distinct from one another ... [N]othing in either
Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a
district court to admit opinion evidence that is
connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of
the expert. A court may conclude that there is
simply too great an analytic gap between the data
and the opinion proffered.50
A. Testimony of Economists
Even prior to the holding in Kumho Tire, the Daubert
standards had been applied by several judges to exclude the
expert testimony of economists,51 and these courts had often
48 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93 (explaining that a trial judge, at the outset, must
decide whether the expert is proposing to testify about scientific knowledge that will
assist the trier of fact to understand a fact at issue); see also In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB
Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1190 (1995) (stating that
an expert's conclusions must be supported by grounds in each step of the analysis: "Any
step that renders the analysis unreliable under the Daubert factors renders the expert's
testimony inadmissible."); Rutigliano v. Valley Bus. Forms, 929 F.Supp. 779, 786 (D.N.J.
1996) (concluding that a doctor's testimony dealing with occupational illness was based on
personal experience and instinct and not from scientific reasoning, and therefore was not
reliable and would not assist the trier of fact in reaching an accurate result).
49 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (quoting U.S. v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir.
1985)).
50 See Gen. Elec., 522 U.S. at 146 (holding that the testimony "did not rise above
,suspicious belief or unsupported speculation"'); see also Jaurequi v. Carter Mfg. Co., 173
F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding trial court's exclusion of testimony
regarding an engineer's alternative design in a products liability case).
51 See, e.g., Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 1997) ("Whether the
expert would opine on economic valuation, advertising psychology, or engineering
application of the Daubert factors is germane to evaluating whether the expert is a hired
gun or a person whose opinion in the courtroom will withstand the same scrutiny that it
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held that such testimony was unreliable because of the poor
methodology employed, particularly if the expert failed to
consider other possible variables in the economic analysis,52
or if the testimony would not aid the jury in its
determination.53 These courts were particularly critical of
testimony tailored specifically toward litigation, without
any evidence of prior testing or acceptance within the
relevant discipline.54
(1) Unreliable Methodology
In a decision the court explicitly compared to Kumho Tire,
the Eighth Circuit in Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v.
American Simmental Assn.55 upheld the disqualification of
an agricultural economist in a case in which the plaintiff,
claiming violations of RICO, the Sherman Act, and the
Lanham Act, sued a breeding association and an individual
who had registered 19 head of cattle.56
In support of its claim, plaintiffs introduced the evidence
would among his professional peers."); Kay v. First Cont'l Trading, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 772,
774-76 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (excluding testimony of statistician because it was lacking in
"accountability for the risks involved"); In re Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litig., 893 F.
Supp. 1497, 1503 (D. Kan. 1995) (holding that there was no factual basis for any
hypothesis which would support expert's calculations and opinion); Ayers v. Robinson, 887
F. Supp. 1049, 1064 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (refusing to admit economist's testimony on hedonic
damages).
52 See Cochran v. Scheider Nat'l Carriers, Inc., 980 F.Supp. 374, 378-80 (D. Kan.
1997) (concluding that economist's testimony regarding parent's loss of financial support
and services from a deceased child should be excluded because of unreliability of
methodology and speculative nature of the damages).
53 See Saia v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 47 F.Supp.2d 141, 148-50 (D. Mass. 1999)
(stating that expert's hedonic damages analysis failed Daubert tests of testability and
acceptability, with the court noting that assumptions underlying damage valuation were
arbitrary and "perhaps most importantly, . . .[the expert's] testimony [would] not assist
the jury in understanding the evidence or determining any fact in issue").
54 See Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litig., 893 F. Supp. at 1506-07 ("Dr. Hoyt's
analysis is driven by the desire to enhance the measure of plaintiffs damages, even at the
expense of well-accepted scientific principles and methodology."); see also D.H.Kaye, The
Dynamics of Daubert: Methodology, Conclusions, and Fit in Statistical and Economic
Studies, 87 VA. L. REV. 1933, 1939 (2001) (discussing how courts fear that the
"infallibility" of some expert testimony lead jurors to give it more credibility than it
deserves).
55 178 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 1999).
56 Id. at 1039.
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of Dr. Alan Baquet, who was to testify that the introduction
of the animals at issue into the full-blood Simmental
market in the United States caused the market value of all
American Simmentals to drop substantially. To support
this testimony, Dr. Baquet posited that following the
introduction of these animals, the United States market
dropped 53 percent, while the Canadian market dropped
only 26 percent; he attributed this 27 percent difference in
market price to the introduction of defendant's animals.57
Plaintiffs contended that Dr. Baquet's research method,
known as the before-and-after model, is a common tool used
by economic researchers, and that the proper remedy for
defendants was to challenge the methodology through cross-
examination and introduction of rebuttal expert
testimony.58
In determining that the testimony was not reliable, the
district court did not dispute that Dr. Baquet was
adequately qualified. Instead, the court found that the
methodology employed was unreliable, stating that the
analysis was "simplistic" in that it attributed the entire
difference in market price within the United States and
Canada to the animals, despite the fact that they made up a
tiny fraction of the market - only 19 out of a total of
138,169.59
57 Id. at 1040.
58 Id.
59 See id. at 1040; see also Adams v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1077,
1110 (S.D. Ind. 1998), in which plaintiff, seeking to use statistical evidence to prove
discrimination against a group to allow the inference of intentional discrimination against
individual members, offered the admissibility of opinion and testimony from a labor
economist. The court, after a lengthy analysis, concluded:
In light of these significant deficiencies, the plaintiffs' statistical evidence appears to
be unreliable, in that the expert failed to explain how his methods comport with
generally accepted scientific principles, and were the proper methods for conducting a
statistical analysis for purposes of supporting a hypothesis about causation. He did
not know what actually occurred in the group of individuals he studied, nor did he
know that they were dissimilar in ways that mattered in terms of the reasons for the
resizing. The statistical evidence is also irrelevant, because it has no tendency to
prove a fact that is material to the plaintiffs' claim.
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The district court suggested it was obvious that at least
one other variable contributed to falling markets, since it
was undisputed that both the Canadian and American
markets were falling prior to the introduction of the
animals.60 Furthermore, during his deposition Dr. Baquet
admitted that various factors contribute to particular
breeds losing market value, and that generally an
economist attempts to identify and evaluate all independent
variables significantly affecting changes in the value of a
breed; he acknowledged that he neglected to consider any
variables other than the introduction of the animals at
issue.61
Agreeing with the district court's exclusion of the
testimony, the Eighth Circuit concluded:
This case is analogous to Kumho. Although Dr. Baquet
utilized a method of analysis typical within his field,
that method is not typically used to make statements
regarding causation without considering all
60 Blue Dane Simmental, 178 F.3d at 1040; see also Stelwagon Mfg. Co. v. Tarmac
Roofing, 63 F.3d 1267 (3d Cir. 1995), in which the court noted that the expert's analysis
failed to sufficiently link any decline in plaintiffs sales to price discrimination because
sales may have been lost for other reasons, such as the fact that plaintiff had higher
overhead costs than its competitors and had experienced several business complications
(including termination of a vice president, two territorial managers, and three key
employees for their part in an embezzlement scheme). Id. at 1275. The Court pointed out
that the only evidence directly linking the violation to any decline in sales and profits was
the anecdotal testimony of plaintiffs employees. Id. at 1274. The plaintiff also failed to
identify a single lost customer. Id. at 1275-76.
61 Blue Dane Simmenthal, 178 F.3d at 1040; see also Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust
Litigation, 983 F. Supp. 1497, a price-fixing case where defendants sought to preclude
plaintiffs' economic expert from testifying about damages caused by defendants' alleged
conspiracy. The court found that nothing in the analysis made the data for his
"normative" period more relevant than any other pre- or post-conspiracy. Id. at 1503.
Furthermore, the court found that the expert had not shown that his "before-and-after"
model accounted for undisputed increases in competition between conspiratorial and
normative periods, nor had he justified his constant cost industry assumption or
application of individual benchmark prices for each defendant. Id. at 1505. See also
Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordiseo Corp., 969 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992), a copyright
infringement case where a professor was hired for the mere appearance of authority,
mocking the concept of expert knowledge. The court held that the expert should have
separated injury due to unlawful conduct from that due to new market entry. Id. at 415-
16.
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independent variables that would affect the conclusion.
We find no evidence in the record that other economists
used before-and-after modeling to support conclusions
of causes of market fluctuation. [citing cases]. Nor do
plaintiffs cite any articles or papers that would support
Dr. Baquet's approach. [citing Kuhmo]. Accordingly, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by excluding Dr. Baquet's testimony.62
(2) Poor "Fit"
In light of Kuhmo Tire, other courts have rejected the
testimony of an economist not because of the methodology
used, but because it did not "fit" the specific facts of the case
under litigation. In Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick
Corp.,63 the Eighth Circuit ruled inadmissible the testimony
of an economist in an antitrust case because not all relevant
circumstances were incorporated into the expert's economic
model, and because the model failed to account for market
events which did not relate to any anti-competitive
conduct.64 The Court focused on the requirement in Daubert
that the expert testimony must not only be based on
reliable science, but must fit the particular facts before the
court.65 Even though a theory meets certain Daubert factors
(such as testing, peer review and publication, known or
potential error rate, and general acceptance), it should not
be admitted at trial if it does not apply to the facts at
hand.66
In Concord Boat, a number of boat manufacturers sued
62 Blue Dane Simmental, 178 F.3d at 1040.
63 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000).
64 Id. at 1057 (finding that "[e]xpert testimony that is speculative is not competent
proof and contributes nothing to a legally sufficient evidentiary basis").
65 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993).
66 See Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d. 1039, 1056 (2000) (noting
that simply meeting some of the Daubert factors may not be enough to determine
admissibility); see also Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 154 (1999); Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
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Brunswick Corporation for violations of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts.67 The plaintiffs evidence to establish
Brunswick's antitrust liability was presented by their sole
expert, Dr. Robert Hall, a professor of economics at
Stanford University, who testified that Brunswick's
monopoly in the stern-drive engine market enabled the
company to use market share discount programs to impose
a "tax" on boat builders and dealers who chose to purchase
engines from other manufacturers.68 Dr. Hall testified that
Brunswick's discount programs, combined with market
power acquired by purchasing Bayliner and Sea Ray,
enabled it to capture 78 percent of the market.69 Dr. Hall
relied on the Cournot model of economic theory, and
postulated that in a stern-drive engine market that was
competitive, Brunswick and some other firm would each
maintain a 50 percent market share; under this theory, any
market share over 50 percent would be prima facie evidence
of anti-competitive conduct on Brunswick's part.70
Brunswick argued that Dr. Hall's opinion should be
excluded because it was contrary to undisputed record
evidence and because it did not separate lawful from
unlawful conduct.71
After reviewing the evidence, the appellate court held it
was clear that not all relevant circumstances were
incorporated into the expert's method of analysis as it
related to antitrust liability, such as:
- Dr. Hall's opinion that Brunswick's discount
programs imposed a tax on boat builders who chose
to purchase engines from other manufacturers was
not supported by evidence. Some boat builders
chose to purchase 100 percent of their engines from
67 Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1047.
68 Id. at 1046.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1046-47.
71 Id. at 1046.
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Brunswick when they only needed to purchase
80 percent to qualify for the maximum discount.
There was also evidence that some boat builders
were willing to forego Brunswick's discounts.72
- The Cournot model of a hypothetical market
ignored inconvenient evidence, such as the fact that
Brunswick achieved a 75% share of the market in
the mid-1980s before it started the discount
programs and before it acquired Bayliner and Sea
Ray. The model also failed to account for market
events which both sides agreed were not related to
any anti-competitive conduct, such as the recall of
OMC's Cobra engine and the problems associated
with the Volvo/OMC merger. 73
The Court therefore concluded that Dr. Hall's opinion
should not be admitted because it did not incorporate all
aspects of the market's economic reality and because it did
not separate lawful from unlawful conduct.74 Because of
these deficiencies, Dr. Hall's opinions were held to be "mere
speculation."75
(3) Standard of Review
The importance of the appellate court's standard of
review in financial cases is well illustrated by Atlantic
Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita,76 in which the
Tenth Circuit relied heavily on the abuse-of-discretion
standard in affirming the district court's exclusion of the
expert's testimony.77 That case involved a dispute over a
gas lease for carbon dioxide in West Texas, where the
72 Id. at 1056.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1057.
75 Id.
76 226 F.3d 1138 (10th Cir. 2000).
77 Id. at 1168.
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lessors offered the testimony of an economist on the
question of fair market value.78 The expert's theory was
that market prices did not provide a reliable indicator of
value in that geographical region because most carbon
dioxide producers are vertically integrated and produce
carbon dioxide primarily for their own use, thereby creating
incentives to keep prices artificially low.79 The expert
instead computed fair market value by equating price in a
hypothetical competitive market with economic benefits
derived by purchasers from use of the gas.8 0
The district court excluded the expert testimony,
maintaining that the expert had developed his views solely
for litigation, had not employed the same methodology on
previous occasions, and had not subjected his methods to
peer review.81 The court also pointed out that the economist
had failed to take account of actual prices of carbon dioxide
in West Texas and comparable markets.82
After thoroughly reviewing the record, the Court of
Appeals held that the district court's conclusion that the
expert strayed too far from available sales data could not, in
the end, be described as "manifestly unreasonable."83 The
appellate court, deferring to the trial court's discretion, then
stated that the exclusion of the evidence was a very close
call, but that the legal standard of review allowed it no
other course of action:
Suffice it to say that our standard of review plays a
major role in the disposition of this issue. Whether
the existence of other markets and the sales data
presented by ARCO fatally undermine Smith's
theory is eminently debatable. If our review were
78 Id. at 1164.
79 Id. at 1165.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1166.
82 Id. at 1167.
83 Id.
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de novo, we might very well conclude that Smith's
theory explains or otherwise accounts for these
markets and data. When we apply an abuse of
discretion standard, however, "we defer to the trial
court's judgment because of its first-hand ability to
view the witness or evidence and assess credibility
and probative value." [citations omitted].84
B. Testimony of Accountants
The Daubert standards had previous to the holding in
Kumho Tire been applied by several courts to exclude the
testimony of accountants,8 5 and those expert opinions which
appeared to be concocted for litigation were notably rejected
by the courts as unreliable.s6
84 Id. at 1168 (quoting Towerridge, Inc. v. T.A.O., Inc., 111 F.3d 758, 763 (10th Cir.
1997)).
85 See, e.g., Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d 183, 186-87 (7th Cir.
1993) (accounting expert admitting he had not employed generally accepted methodology);
Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. Lipson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 758, 762 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (stating that
expert's opinion must be "squarely grounded in the principles and methodology of the
relevant discipline," no matter how impressive his credentials); De Jager Constr., Inc. v.
Schleininger, 938 F. Supp. 446, 447-49, 455 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (excluding opinions of
accounting expert because too speculative and of little probative value because principles
and methodology underlying testimony were based upon speculation).
86 See Lipson, 46 F.Supp.2d at 764, an insider trading action where court found
unreliable the expert's opinion because it was not premised on the principles, practices, or
methodology of accounting; the expert never attempted to audit, determine the accuracy,
or assess the reliability of those reports. The court noted:
First, the Court finds that Mr. Perks' opinions that the internal financial reports in March
and April 1995 were unreliable are not sufficiently rooted in the principles and
methodology of accountancy. Mr. Perks' deposition testimony makes explicit what is
implicit in his Rule 26 report: that he did not attempt to audit the Supercuts' internal
financial reports, that he did not attempt to determine their accuracy, and that he did not
assess the reliability of those reports in reporting revenue or how revenues compare to
budget. Moreover, although Mr. Perks cited as one basis for his opinion an Arthur
Andersen report for the audit period covering 1993, which he described as finding
"material weakness" in Supercuts' internal controls, Mr. Perks did not explain in his
report or his deposition what consideration, if any, he gave to the fact that Arthur
Andersen did not find any material weaknesses for the audit periods 1994-1995. Expert
opinion that is "carefully tailored to support [a] position" is not reliable.
Id. (quoting Minasian v. Standard Charter Bank, 109 F.3d 1212, 1216 (7th Cir. 1997)).
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(1) Unreliable Methodology
In the recent case of Children's Broadcasting Corp. v.
Walt Disney Co.,87 ABC Radio had agreed to conduct
advertising sales, affiliate developing, and consulting for
Children's Broadcasting but later exercised its right to
terminate the agreement after Disney acquired ABC.
Children's brought suit against ABC and Disney for fraud,
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, and
misappropriation of trade secrets as to Children's
advertiser lists, advertising rates, and programming
methods.88 After a jury verdict for Children's, the district
court granted a motion for directed verdict, excluding the
expert testimony on damages offered by Dr. Stephen Willis,
one of Children's experts, as unreliable because it was
speculative and based upon faulty assumptions.89
The Eighth Circuit held that while plaintiffs expert used
uncontroversial accounting methods (i.e., discounted cash
flow), he failed to take legitimate Disney competition into
account. The expert also erred by testifying that any
breach of contract, any use of confidential information, and
any misappropriation of trade secrets would have caused
exactly the same damages.90 The Court noted substantial
deficiencies in the expert's opinion:
[The plaintiffs expert] acknowledged, however, that
he did not take into account the announcement of
Radio Disney as a competitor when drawing his
conclusions. The agreement between Children's
and ABC Radio did not include a non-compete
clause, and the establishment of Radio Disney
cannot be considered wrongful conduct. The
87 245 F.3d 1008, 1013 (8th Cir. 2001).
88 Id. at 1015.
89 Id. (stating that "Villis's damages projections went so far beyond realistic
optimism as to be 'fairy-tale-like").
90 Id. at 1018 (noting that the "assertion that any or all of the alleged wrongful acts
would have caused the same outcome is dubious").
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existence of Radio Disney was relevant to Children's
value, but [plaintiffs expert] did not consider it.91
Children's argued that the Daubert decision sanctions
only evaluations of an expert's methods, not their
conclusions, but the court, citing General Electric Co. v.
Joiner,92 responded that an expert's methodology must be
linked to conclusions by ties stronger than mere ipse dixit.93
Concluding (a) that the expert failed to consider the effect of
competition on the plaintiff, (b) that his theory of causation
was questionable, and (c) that his report was based on a
report prepared before the plaintiffs claims were narrowed
for trial, the appellate court held that the trial court had
not abused its discretion in excluding the expert's
testimony.94
(2) Standard of Review
The latitude provided to a district court's decision to
exclude the financial testimony of an accountant was
reiterated in Seatrax, Inc. v. Sonbeck Int'l, Inc.,95 a lawsuit
claiming trademark infringement and misappropriation of a
trade secret for offshore marine cranes. In that case,
plaintiff offered an expert with fifteen years of experience in
the marine crane industry to opine on defendant's profits
from the sale of replacement parts and the diversion of
sales due to unfair trade practices.96 The expert's testimony
was excluded by the district court because the expert had
no formal training in accounting and conducted no
91 Id. at 1019.
92 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
93 Id. at 146 (observing that a court "may conclude that there is simply too great an
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered").
94 Children's Broad. Corp., 245 F.3d at 1018. The court noted that the jury award of
$20 million in damages for the breach of contract terminable on 90 days' notice suggested
that the jury gave weight to the expert's estimate, and that a new damage trial was
therefore appropriate on the theory that the $127 million estimate tainted the first trial.
Id. at 1019.
95 200 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 2000).
96 Id. at 371.
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independent examination of defendant's gross sales
figures.97 In deferring to the abuse of discretion standard,
the Fifth Circuit concisely stated:
In the instant case, the record reveals that the court
thoroughly reviewed Campbell's proffered
testimony. In its ruling to exclude Campbell's
testimony, the magistrate judge noted that
Campbell did not have any formal or professional
training in accounting. Furthermore, Campbell did
not conduct any independent examination of
Sonbeck's gross sales figures, which were provided
by Seatrax's attorneys.98
The Court therefore concluded that there was no abuse of
discretion on the part of the district court in excluding the
expert's testimony:
In a complex case involving trademark
infringement, Campbell's lack of former training or
education in accounting, and his failure to conduct
an independent analysis of Sonbeck's sales figures
were insurmountable obstacles for Seatrax in its
attempt to qualify him as an expert. Under these
circumstances, the court's ruling did not amount to
an abuse of discretion.99
CONCLUSION
In a highly volatile economy resulting in litigation in
which the expert knowledge of economists and accountants
is increasingly called into play, the gatekeeping provisions
of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as interpreted by Daubert
and Kumho Tire, will undoubtedly be more stringently
97 Id. at 372.
98 Id.
99 Id.
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applied to financial opinions and testimony in the future, in
spite of the fact that such financial data may not be as
susceptible to precise scrutiny as scientific matters. This
trend has been borne out both by early appellate decisions
and those written in the light of Kumho Tire, and it is clear
that the courts will not only apply the enumerated Daubert
factors but other parameters to ensure that financial expert
evidence conforms to a routine methodology that is both
reliable and relevant to the facts before the court. Such
judicial scrutiny will ensure that the jury is not forced to
speculate on tenuous evidence, and that an expert will
employ in the courtroom the same intellectual rigor used in
the financial discipline itself.

